Abstract "Guess Who?" is a popular two player game where players ask "Yes" or "No" questions to search for their opponent's secret identity from a pool of possible candidates. We model this as a simple stochastic game under the assumption that the opponent's secret identity is uniformly distributed. Using this model, we explicitly find the optimal strategy and prove it is optimal for both players and for all possible candidate pool sizes. Contrary to popular belief, performing a binary search is not the optimal strategy for both players. Instead, the optimal strategy for the player who trails is to make certain bold plays in an attempt catch up. We also find an interesting log-periodic behavior that naturally arises in the landscape of this game. The findings here can be used to balance the starting position of the game in order to offset first turn advantage.
Introduction
"Guess Who?" is a zero-sum two player game where players take turns asking "Yes" or "No" questions to find their opponent's secret identity [12] . Each player keeps track of a finite pool of possible candidates for their opponent's secret identity. Players alternate turns asking a "Yes" or "No" question (that their opponent must answer truthfully) about their opponent's identity and reduce their pool of possible candidates. For example, if Player 1 asks: "Does your character have blue eyes?" and Player 2 answers "No", Player 1 eliminates all candidates in his pool that have blue eyes. Eventually, only one candidate remains in the pool and this last character must be their opponents secret identity! The first player to narrow their pool down to a single character in this way wins the game.
To model this game mathematically we will make the following assumptions:
• The secret identity of the opponent is uniformly distributed amongst all possible candidates. Because of the eliminating nature of the "Yes"/"No" questions, this property persists throughout the game. With this assumption, only the number of remaining characters in the pool is relevant to the analysis, not the details of which characters in particular are remaining.
• For any candidate pool size n and any 1 ≤ b ≤ n − 1, it is always possible to construct a question for which exactly b candidates correspond to the "Yes" answer. One way to do this is to sort the candidates alphabetically and ask "Does your character's name come alphabetically before ?" where the name is chosen to be the name which is b-th on the list. We use the terminology a "bid of size b" for such a "Yes"/"No" question.
With these assumptions, "Guess Who?" can be modeled as a so called simple stochastic game as defined in [2] . The strategy of the game is in choosing the bid size. Players can balance risk vs. reward on each turn by varying their bid size. The bid b = 1 is a risky play: it gives a small chance to win the game immediately but is more likely to reduce the candidate pool by only 1. In contrast, a bid of b = 1 2 n is the least risky bid. The main result of this article is to find the optimal bidding strategy for this game and prove that it is optimal: Theorem 1.1. (Optimal Strategy and Optimal Probabilities for "Guess Who?") When Player 1 has n candidates in their pool and Player 2 has m candidates in their pool, Player 1 has the following optimal strategy:
for some k ∈ N ∪ {0}, then Player 1 is in the weeds and must make a bold move to catch up! Their optimal play is a bid of b * (n, m) = 2 k = 2 log 2 (m−1) and the probability Player 1 wins if both players play optimally is:
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, then Player 1 has the upper hand and can stay ahead by making a low risk play! Their optimal play is a bid of b * (n, m) = 1 2 n and the probability Player 1 wins if both players play optimally is:
The proof of Theorem 1.1 is provided in Section 4, and goes by solving a recurrence relation that p (n, m) satisfies. Figure 1 shows a plot of Player 1's probability of winning and his optimal bid on his turn as a function of the pool sizes(n, m). 
Bold Plays
It is an elementary entropy calculation that the safe bid b = 1 2 n will minimize the expected number of "Yes"/"No" questions for Player 1. This is not the optimal strategy in "Guess Who?" because Player 1 does not want to minimize this expected value: instead he wants to maximize the probability of getting there before Player 2 does. This race against the opponent is what drives the optimal bidding behavior when Player 1 is significantly behind his opponent. When this happens, Player 1's optimal strategy is a bold bid, b = 2 log 2 (m−1) which depends only on Player 2's (!) remaining pool, and is always strictly < 1 2 n . This has a low probability of success (always strictly< 1 2 ) but would put Player 1 back in the running if he were lucky.
The concept of risky plays with big payoffs in stochastic games has a rich history. A classic example is the single player casino game red-and-black when playing against a subfair casino [3] . There is also a two player version of red-and-black, where players try to bankrupt each other, which has also been extensively studied and bold plays have also been found to be valuable, see [8, 7, 1] .
Another example, more similar to "Guess Who?", is the two player dice game "Pig" where players race to 100 points while managing risk vs. reward on each of their turns. Without the complication of racing against the opponent, this type of dice game is amenable to exact analysis, see [5, 10] . However, the interplay between two racing players complicates things. The optimal strategy has been calculated numerically in situations where both players have < 100 points using dynamical programming techniques, but there is no known simple description of the optimal strategy like we have for "Guess Who?", see [6] . The optimal strategy to "Guess Who?" in Theorem 1.1 is satisfying because we can find a simple exact solution on how and when to play boldly.
Log Periodicity
The landscape of the game exhibits a log periodic behavior. In particular for fixed c > 0 , p (n, cn) does not converge as n → ∞. Instead it approaches a function which is periodic in log 2 (n). This kind of behavior is not uncommon in this kind of stochastic system, for example see group Russian roulette [11] Figure 2 shows a plot of p ∞ (α, β) in this L shaped region. The landscape of p ∞ can be understood by tiling scaled copies of this L shaped region onto the entire quadrant. Section 3 contains more details on this asymptotic function p * ∞ . An application of this analytic result is to be able to alter the initial state of the game to make the game fair for both players. Traditionally, the game starts both players with the same candidate pool. This gives Player 1 a significant first turn advantage: if he plays optimally he will win with a probability between 5 8 and 2 3 , depending on the particular starting size. It would be more fair to start Player 1 with a larger pool of candidates to offset his advantage from playing first. The analysis here shows that the fair way to do this is enlarge his starting pool by a factor between The asymptotic probability p ∞ (2 k α, 2 k β) of Player 1 winning from the position n, m,
. By tiling the entire quadrant with enlarged copies of this L-shaped region, the entire landscape p ∞ (n, m) can be understood. This illustrates the log-periodic nature of
The Model
Definition 2.1. "Mathematician's Guess Who" is a game between two players played on the statespace:
The first entry indicates the number of people remaining in Player 1's pool of possible candidates for Player 2's mystery character. (This is the number of characters who have not yet been removed from consideration through previous questions.) The second entry indicates the same thing for Player 2. The last token, either P 1 or P 2 indicates whose turn it is to play. Players alternate turns.
If the last token is P 1 , it is Player 1's turn. On his turn, from the state n, m, P 1 , Player 1 makes a bid (All random chances in this game are independent of one another.) Afterward it is Player 1's turn again and play repeats. Players continue in this way until either player reduces his pool of candidates to exactly 1. When this happens that player immediately wins.
1 That is to say that the following states are terminal states for the game:
The state 1, 1, P i is undefined because there is no way to reach this state without first passing through one of the previously defined terminal states.
Remark 2.2. Definition 2.1puts the game of "Guess Who?" in the framework of a Simple Stochastic Game as defined in [9] [2]. These are also sometimes called 2 1 2 -player games, where in addition to Player 1 and Player 2, the randomness in the game is thought of as 1 2 of a player. Because of the randomness inherent in these games there is no strategy for either player that guarantees victory. (Indeed, in "Guess Who?", the opponent can always make a bid of 1, and if they are lucky, will immediately win.) Definition 2.3. The theory of simple stochastic Games from [9] , [2] show that there exists an optimal bidding strategy we will denote by b : N × N → N and an optimal probability function we will denote by p : N × N → [0, 1] that are optimal for Player 1 in the sense that 2 :
• If Player 1 makes a bid of b (n, m) whenever the state n, m, P 1 is encountered, then no matter what strategy Player 2 chooses, Player 1 wins with probability ≥ p (n, m)
• If Player 1 uses any other bidding strategy whatsoever at the state n, m, P 1 , then Player 2 has a strategy that ensures that Player 1 wins with probability ≤ p (n, m)
When both players play their optimal strategies, Player 1 will win with probability exactly p (n, m). Since "Guess Who?" is symmetric between Player 1 and Player 2 (in the sense that the position n, m, P 1 is functionally identical to the position m, n, P 2 ), the optimal bidding function for Player 2 from n, m, P 2 is b (m, n) and Player 2's optimal probability to win from n, m, P 2 is p (m, n). By the same token, Player 1's probability to win from n, m, P 2 is 1 − p (m, n) since Player 1 wins if and only if Player 2 loses. Both players strategies and bids can be encapsulated in a single function. Without loss of generality then, will thus normally take the point of view of Player 1 in our analysis. Because of this symmetry, the optimal probability function satisfies a nice recurrence relation:
Proposition 2.4. p (n, m) and b (n, m) satisfy the following recurrence relation:
(For the case the argmax is not unique: any b that maximizes the function will work for Player 1's optimal strategy)
Proof
) since with probability b n we move to the position b, m, P 2 where Player 1's probability to win is 1 − p (m, n) and with probability n−b n we move to the position n − b, m, P 2 where Player 1's probability to win is 1 − p (m, n − b).
It must be that p (n, m) = max b∈[1,n−1] p b (n, m) since Player 1 must bid some value of b at the position n, m, P 1 , and the optimal strategy is no worse than any fixed bid b. Similarly, any b that has p b (n, m) = p(n, m) means that bidding b at the position n, m, P 1 is an optimal bid. Remark 2.5. "Guess Who?" has a nice structure because the sum s = n + m is a strictly decreasing function as the game progresses. Indeed, this sum is guaranteed to decrease by at least 1 on each players turn. This observation, along with the initial data ∀m
"In the weeds" and "the upper hand"
We now divide the statespace S into some subsets which turn out to be relevant for discussing the optimal strategy in the game. This division was discovered by careful examination of the output of Algorithm 1.
Definition 2.6. Define the set W k,P1 ⊂ S by:
When n, m, P 1 ∈ W k,P1 , we say that Player 1 is in the weeds at level k, or if n, m, P 1 ∈ ∞ k=0 W k,P1 we say Player 1 is in the weeds without specifying which level. Similarly, W k,P2 := n, m, P 2 : 2 k+1 + 1 ≤ m and 2 k + 1 ≤ n ≤ 2 k+1 and we use the same terminology for Player 2.
Definition 2.7. Define the set U k,P1 ⊂ S by:
When n, m, P 1 ∈ U k,P1 , we say that Player 1 has the upper hand at level k, or if n, m, P 1 ∈ ∞ k=0 W k,P1 we say Player 1 has the upper hand without specifying which level. Similarly, U k,P2 := n, m, P 2 : 2 k + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2 k+1 and 2 k ≤ n and we use the same terminology for Player 2.
With these two definitions solidified, the description of the optimal strategy for the game is very simple: players should bid 2 k when in the weeds at level k and should bid 1 2 n when they have the upper hand.
Asymptotic Heuristics
The exact formula in Theorem 1.1 is proven by induction, which does does not shed much light on how the formula is discovered or what the individual terms in it represent. To aid understanding, we present here a heuristic derivation of the formula for p (n, m) which is how the formula was originally found. From numerically computing p (n, m) and b (n, m) for some small values of n, m using Algorithm 1, we get an ansatz on the optimal bidding strategy b (n, m). Using this ansatz and also making several simplifying assumptions that are all in the vein of assuming that n, m are very large, we will derive an asymptotic approximation to p (n, m). We will denote this approximation by p ∞ (n, m). Simplifying Assumptions:
• We ignore the requirement that the candidate pool sizes and bid sizes are integers. We instead assume that Player 1's pool is size n = 2 k α with α ∈ (1, ∞) and Player 2's pool is size m = 2 k β with β ∈ (1, ∞) and we also assume that max(α, β) ≤ 2 (otherwise we can change k to make this the case). We allow any positive real number valued bids, not just integer valued ones. This means that we can think of p ∞ as a function p * ∞ : R + × R + → (0, 1)
• We will also assume that the level k is very large so that only the values α and β in the pool sizes above are relevant. In other words, we treat the position n = 2 k α and m = 2 k β as identical to the position n = 2 α and m = 2 β even if k = . We will also replace sums with k terms by their corresponding infinite sums. This means that p * ∞ (2x, 2y) = p * ∞ (x, y) for every x and y, and thus to understand p * ∞ it suffices to understand the L shaped region
Optimal Bidding Ansatz:
• We assume both players play according to the following strategy: they bid 2 k when in the weeds at level k (i.e. Player 1 bids 2 k when α > 2 and β ∈ (1, 2] ), and bid half their total when they have the upper hand (i.e. Player 1 bids Lemma 3.1. Assume the simplifying assumptions and the optimal bidding ansatz. Suppose we are at the position 2 k α, 2 k β, P 1 with α > 2 and β ∈ (1, 2], so that Player 1 is in the weeds at level k. Then, the probability that Player 1 ever exits the weeds at any point throughout the game is 2 α .
Proof. Since Player 1 is in the weeds at level k, his first bid is 2 k . This means that his pool size becomes:
with probability
If his pool size becomes 2 k , the pool sizes are now n = 2 k ,m ≥ 2 k+1 meaning that Player 1 now has escaped the weeds and has the upper hand. Thus Player 1 escapes from the weeds on the first guess with probability k β and so Player 2's new pool size will be exactly 2 k−1 β. Thus, if Player 1 fails to escape the weeds at this level, the game state moves to n = 2 k−1 (2(α − 1)) and m = 2 k−1 β. Treating k as irrelevant, this position is handled by the same analysis as above with a new α-value which is α = 2(α − 1). Player 1's probability to escape the weeds at this stage is
. This analysis can be repeated over and over again. Finally, to find the probability Player 1 ever escapes the weeds, we sum up his probability to escape at each trial: P (Player 1 ever escapes the weeds)
Fortunately the product terms in this expansion telescope very nicely! We remain with:
P (Player 1 ever escapes the weeds)
+ . . .
Treating this as an infinite sum gives the desired estimate of 2 α .
Next we prove a lemma about the position 2 k · 4, 2 k · 2, P 1 . This position is important because it is naturally encountered when both players play according to the optimal bidding ansatz.
Lemma 3.2. Assume the simplifying assumptions and the optimal bidding ansatz. Starting from the position 2 k · 4, 2 k · 2, P 1 (i.e. α = 4, β = 2), the probability Player 1 loses the game is 2 3 Proof
by Lemma 3.1. b) Player 1 successfully gets out of the weeds at some point and puts Player 2 in the weeds; then Player 2 himself gets out of the weeds; and finally player Player 1 subsequently loses the game from that position. When Player 1 does get out of the weeds, the position will be n = 2 · 2 and m = 2 · 4 for some , (i.e. the game evolves to α = 2, β = 4). Thus the probability that Player 2 gets out of the weeds from this point is also 2 4 . When Player 2 does successfully get out of the weeds, the position will be n = 2 j · 4 and m = 2 j · 2 for some j, (i.e. we the state has evolved back to the position α = 4, β = 2). Thus we have the estimate:
= P (P1 never escapes weeds) + P (P1 escapes weeds) P (P2 escapes weeds) P P1 loses from 2 j ·4,2 j ·2,P1
Since one of our assumptions is that the exponent k and j are irrelevant here, we may assume that the positions 2 k · 4, 2 k · 2, P 1 and 2 j · 4, 2 j · 2, P 1 are identical. Solving the linear equation p = k+1 . While keeping track of the exact levels is doable in this simple case, this quickly becomes problematic for general n and m.
Proposition 3.4. Assume the simplifying assumptions and the optimal bidding ansatz. Suppose we are at the position n, m, P 1 = 2 k α, 2 k β, P 1 with α > 2 and β ∈ (1, 2], so that Player 1 is in the weeds at level k. Then, the probability that Player 1 wins the game is:
Proof. We calculate the probability that Player 1 loses. As in Lemma 3.2, Player 1 can lose the game in one of two disjoint ways: a) Player 1 never gets out of the weeds. The probability that Player 1 never gets out of the weeds is 1 − 2 α by Lemma 3.1. b) Player 1 successfully gets out of the weeds at some point and puts Player 2 in the weeds; then Player 2 himself gets out of the weeds; and finally player Player 1 subsequently loses the game from that position. When Player 1 does get out of the weeds, the position will be n = 2 · 2 and m = 2 · (2β) for some , (i.e. the position evolves to α = 2, β = 2β). Thus the probability that Player 2 gets out of the weeds from this point is 2 2β . When Player 2 does successfully get out of the weeds, the position will be n = 2 j · 4 and m = 2 j · 2 for some j, (i.e. we will be at α = 4, β = 2). We have already analyzed this position in Lemma 3.2. Thus we have the estimate: P P1 loses from 2 k α, 2 k β, P 1 = P (P1 never escapes weeds) + P (P1 escapes weeds) P (P2 escapes weeds) P P1 loses from 2 j ·4,2 j ·2,P1
As desired.
Proposition 3.5. Assume the simplifying assumptions and the optimal bidding ansatz. Suppose we are at the position n, m, P 1 = 2 k α, 2 k β, P 1 with α ∈ (1, 2] and β > 2, so that Player 1 has the upper hand. Then, the probability that Player 1 wins the game is:
Proof. When Player 1 has the upper hand, he bids exactly 1 2 n k α and puts Player 2 in the weeds. By the symmetry between Player 1 and Player 2, we already know the probability that Player 2 wins from this position. Have:
Remark 3.6. Despite being based on simplifying assumptions, this analysis comes remarkably close to the true value p (n, m). Indeed we have:
The corrections − 
Proof of Theorem 1.1
Having guessed at the formula using our heuristic derivation, we now prove Theorem 1.1 rigorously. Define functions:
By stitching these functions together, these define the total function q(n, m):
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that n, m, P 1 ∈ W k,P1 for some k. Then:
and the maximum is achieved at b = 2 k .
Proof. By symmetry between b and n − b, we assume WOLOG that 1 ≤ b ≤ First notice that we must have ≤ k − 1, since otherwise b ≥ 2 k + 1 and since we also have n − b ≥ 2 k + 1 this would contradicts our hypothesis that n ≤ 2 k+1 . In this case we have:
Since 2 +1 ≤ m here, it follows that for a fixed , the above is a monotone increasing function of b! We thus obtain an inequality by replacing b by its maximum value b = 2 +1 , with equality if and only if b = 2 +1 : Case I: b, m, P 2 ∈ W ,P2 for = log 2 (b − 1) and n − b, m, P 2 ∈ U k,P2 . As in Case I of Lemma 4.1, it must be that ≤ k − 1. Also observe that 2 k + 1 ≤ n ≤ 2 k+1 and 2 k + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2 k+1 here. Now, since n − b ≥ 2 k + 1, we have b ≤ n − 2 k − 1 ≤ 2 k+1 − 2 k − 1 ≤ 2 k − 1. Thus following the argument from Case I in the Lemma 4.1, we have:
